Recent Upper House elections in Japan have highlighted a concerning trend: as the lives of ordinary citizens face increasing economic strain, a willingness to direct frustration towards minority groups appears to be growing. While addressing the complex issues of a shrinking economy and falling real wages should be paramount, the narrative has, at times, been overshadowed by the rise of a fringe political party capitalizing on anti-immigration sentiment.
Japan’s economy continues to grapple with challenges. In the first quarter of 2025, real GDP fell by an annualized 0.2%, and while nominal wage growth has been seen, real wages have fallen. Inflation, particularly in food items like rice (up over 100% year-on-year in May 2025), is a persistent concern, impacting household budgets and consumer sentiment. Compounding this, the traditionally governing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) faces public dissatisfaction due to these economic woes and lingering discontent over a funding scandal, which has fueled protest votes.
This environment has provided fertile ground for parties like the right-wing Sanseito, which advocates for “Japanese First” policies and fewer overseas workers. Despite winning only three seats in the 2024 Lower House vote and three in the recent Tokyo assembly election, Sanseito made significant gains in the July 2025 Upper House election, securing 14 seats and becoming the fourth-largest opposition force. This surge, partly attributed to the lack of attractive alternatives among mainstream parties, has alarmed many, raising questions about whether Japan is heading down a path of right-wing populism akin to movements seen in the U.S. and U.K.
However, a closer look at Japan’s situation reveals nuances. Unlike Western nations where immigration has often been a central grievance, Japan faces an acute and growing labor crunch. Its working-age population declined by 890,000 last year alone. Foreign residents, whose numbers have nearly doubled in the past decade to reach 3.8 million as of the end of 2024 (approximately 3.04% of the total population), are crucial for maintaining basic services, from staffing convenience stores to driving trucks. The idea that foreign workers are “stealing jobs” simply doesn’t hold water in this context.
Furthermore, illegal immigration, a significant driver of populist movements elsewhere, is not a widespread issue in Japan. The number of visa overstayers has collapsed in recent years, and Japan admits few asylum seekers, maintaining tight border controls. The vast majority of foreign residents are productive members of society. While there are some “growing pains” associated with the increasing foreign population, such as a surge in ill-mannered tourists and concerns about wealthy foreign buyers straining the housing market in central Tokyo and Osaka, these are generally viewed as manageable issues rather than existential threats.
Recent polls reinforce this perspective: while the issue of foreign nationals is present in the political discourse, policies related to dealing with high prices remain the top concern for 30% of voters in the Upper House election, with policies regarding foreigners ranking fifth at just 6%. This suggests that while economic hardship is undeniably creating public frustration, and some are drawn to simplistic, anti-minority narratives as an outlet for this discontent, the core of the problem lies elsewhere.
It is critical for citizens to recognize that while economic hardship is a legitimate source of frustration, channeling that frustration into hatred against minority groups offers no genuine solution to their problems. Instead, it represents a dangerous diversion from addressing the root causes of economic stagnation. For ordinary citizens, understanding this distinction is vital to prevent the erosion of social cohesion and to ensure that political discourse remains focused on constructive solutions for a more prosperous and inclusive society.
All names of people and organizations appearing in this story are pseudonyms
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